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The Reverend Anthony Freeman gained a brief moment of fame last year when he lost 
his parish because his bishop took him to be an unbeliever. The British national 
newspapers enjoyed the spectacle of an ‘atheist vicar’ for a while; however, Mr Freeman 
himself always denied that he was an atheist. One paper reported an interview with his 
local parish magazine, where Mr Freeman was asked directly whether he believed in 
God. Mr Freeman replied that of course he did, but that working out exactly what it 
means to believe in God was his life’s work. It may not unreasonable to ask how one can 
be so confident in believing something when one does not know exactly what it is. 
We find a curious parallel to Mr Freeman’s views in recent philosophical 
discussions of physicalism (the thesis that, in some sense, everything is physical). 
Chapter 3 of Jeffrey Poland’s new exposition and defence of physicalism is called 
‘Identification of the Physical Bases’. The task Professor Poland sets himself here is that 
of spelling out in a principled way what ‘physical’ means, and to say this in a way that 
makes physicalism an illuminating doctrine. (For example, it would not be illuminating to 
be told that ‘physical’ applies to the subject matter of physics unless we are told in 
independent terms what physics is.) Poland claims, quite correctly, that this is one of the 
‘deepest foundational issues facing physicalists’. But as he says, the issue has ‘been all 
but ignored by proponents of physicalism’. Poland does not point out what a peculiar 
state of affairs this is: many philosophers believe in physicalism, but few have said 
exactly what it means. The comparison with Anthony Freeman’s case is irresistible: ‘of 
course we believe in physicalism; but working out exactly what this means is our life’s 
work’.  
Why should there be this problem of identifying the ‘physical bases’? Part of the 
reason is because many modern physicalists want to avoid eliminating non-physical 
phenomena (notably, mental phenomena) from their theories. Earlier versions of 
physicalism tried to incorporate non-physical phenomena by identifying them with 
physical phenomena: mental states for example, are strictly identical with physico-
chemical states of the brain. This view collapsed some time in the 1970s under pressure 
from the so-called ‘variable realisation’ objection: it is empirically unlikely that all 
instances of (say) of the mental state of thinking about Vienna are identical to instances 
of the same brain state. Since then, physicalists have been looking for a way of ‘basing’ 
non-physical phenomena in physical phenomena without resorting to this discredited 
‘identity theory’. Hence the need to identify the ‘physical bases’: if physicalists want to 
base non-physical phenomena on physical phenomena, then they need to give some 
account of what these bases are.  
Professor Poland’s book defends a version of physicalism along these lines, and 
anyone wanting a detailed exposition of this (fairly orthodox) view will want to read his 
book. The essence of the view is that physicalism is a programme for unifying knowledge 
based on the assumption that physical entities ‘exhaust, determine and realise’ all that 
there is. This view does not deny the existence of non-physical entities, or identify 
apparently non-physical entities with physical entities. What it does rule out are entities 
which have an existence independently of any physical basis (Poland’s slogan: ‘There are 
no ghosts!’). 
Physicalism has achieved such an orthodox status in English-speaking philosophy 
that it is a good thing to address the reasons for adopting it. Poland offers a fairly 
exhaustive survey of these reasons, some of which are more convincing than others. (He 
provides little defence, for example, for the remarkable claim that research in cognitive 
science ‘cannot be made intelligible’ unless we assume physicalism.) But what is missing 
from the book is any recognition that there are any viable alternatives to physicalism: that 
there can be any way of organising scientific knowledge which does not either collapse 
into physicalism or commit itself to the existence of ‘ghosts’. For this reason at least, 
Poland’s book is ultimately for initiates: those who have decided that they are 
physicalists, but want to know exactly what this means.   
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